We discuss Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Specifically, we give a characterization for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in such a combinatorial auction when valuations by two bidders satisfy symmetric and subadditive properties. Based on this characterization, we can obtain an algorithm for deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists in such a combinatorial auction.
In a combinatorial auction, m items M = {1, 2, . . . , m} are offered for sale to n bidders N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each bidder i has a valuation f i that assigns a nonnegative real number to every subset S of M. The objective is to find a partition S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n of M among the bidders such that the social welfare n i=1 f i (S i ) is maximized. The combinatorial auction problem is sometimes called the social welfare problem when we disregard strategic issues on bidders' selfish concerns. VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanisms optimize the social welfare in a combinatorial auction with selfish bidders. However, it may take exponential time in m and n. Actually, the social welfare problem is shown to be NP-hard by Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan, even if every valuation f i (i ∈ N) satisfies submodularity [12] ( f i : 2 M → R + is
submodular if f i (S ∪T )+ f i (S ∩T ) ≤ f i (S )+ f i (T ) for all S , T ⊆ M and is subadditive if f i (S ∪ T ) ≤ f i (S ) + f i (T ) for all S , T ⊆ M).
Therefore approximation algorithms have also been proposed for the social welfare problem (in a combinatorial auction). Since each valuation f i is defined by 2 m subsets of M, most proposed approximation algorithms are based on oracle models. Two oracle models, the value queries oracle model and the demand queries oracle model, are commonly used. Furthermore, in most proposed approximation algorithms, each valuation f i is restricted to satisfy some conditions. Two restrictions, submodularity and subadditivity, are commonly used. For the submodular social welfare problem (i.e., each valuation is submodular) with the value queries oracle model, the following are known. Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan proposed a 1 2 -approximation algorithm [12] . Khot et al. showed that this problem cannot be approximated to a factor better than 1 − 1 e unless P = NP [10] , where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Vondrák proposed a randomized (1− 1 e )-approximation algorithm [15] . Using the more powerful demand queries oracle model, Dobzinski 1 Chuo University, Bunkyo, Tokyo 112-8551, Japan a) a16.x6wr@g.chuo-u.ac.jp b) asano@ise.chuo-u.ac.jp and Schapira proposed an improved (1 − 1 e )-approximation algorithm for the submodular social welfare problem [6] .
For the more general subadditive social welfare problem (where each valuation is subadditive), Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira proposed an Ω(1/ log m)-approximation algorithm using the value queries oracle model [5] . Using the more powerful demand queries oracle model, Feige proposed a 1 2 -approximation algorithm for the subadditive social welfare problem and also showed that it is NP-hard to approximate to a factor better than 1 2 [8] . He also proposed a (1 − 1 e )-approximation algorithm for the fractional subadditive (more general than submodular, but more restricted than subadditive) social welfare problem.
As suggested before, the social welfare problem we overviewed above has a central administrator who has the right to make a decision. The administrator makes a decision by collecting valuations and then performing a centralized computation based on approximation algorithms. Recently, however, market-types of social welfare problems have been actively considered in which there are no central administrators. In these market-types of problems, bidders make decisions based on prices and their own valuations, which involves much less central coordination. Here prices can serve to decentralize the markets, as can be seen in socio-economic activities in the real world. If we replace the role of the central administrator by a particular scheme for pricing items, then allowing bidders to follow their own self-interests based on valuations and prices can lead to good decisions. Thus a market-type of social welfare problem, i.e., a combinatorial auction in this paper, is a game theoretical version of traditional social welfare problem. Bidders have incentives to maximize their own payoffs which are determined based on valuations and prices. Thus, there is a competition for items among bidders in a combinatorial auction. In solutions obtained by algorithms for the traditional social welfare problem, some bidders may feel that they are unfairly treated. Thus, a solution is required so that, in some sense, all bidders are satisfied with items they obtain in the solution. This leads to the concept of Nash equilibria (defined below). For a market-type of social welfare problem (i.e., combinatorial auction), a social optimal solution is very nice in a global sense, however, in some cases, bidders may not be satisfied with the solution from their own selfish concerns of view. Thus, a good Nash equilibrium may be required in a combinatorial auction from the stability point of view. Research on computing a good Nash equilibrium and deciding the existence of Nash equilibria is the most fundamental in a combinatorial auction and there has been much recent research on this topic. The price of anarchy, the ratio of the value of a social optimal solution to that of a worst Nash equilibrium, plays a similar role as an approximation ratio in approximation algorithms.
For a partition S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n of M where each bidder i obtains the items in S i , the price, denoted by price(S i ), is attached to S i in a combinatorial auction. The payoff of bidder i is defined by f i (S i )− price(S i ). Each selfish bidder i wants to maximize his/her own payoff. The combinatorial auctions that are used in practice are different from VCG mechanisms. For example, eBay uses an auction in which m items are sold in m independent second-price auctions. Thus, item bidding, as a combinatorial auction scheme, occurs rather "spontaneously" and this type of auction is called a combinatorial auction with item bidding [3] . Thus, a bidder's strategy is the m-dimensional vector of bids that the bidder submits in the different single-item auctions. As mentioned above, each selfish bidder i wants to maximize his/her own payoff. A bid profile of all bidders' bid vectors is a pure Nash equilibrium if no bidder wants to change his/her own bid vector assuming that any other bidders keep their own bid vectors.
For a combinatorial auction with item bidding where all bidders' valuations are submodular, Christodoulou, Kovács, and Schapira showed that there is always a pure Nash equilibrium and proposed an algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium which is a 1 2 -approximation to the optimal social welfare in polynomial time in n and m [3] . They also showed that the price of anarchy is at most 2. Bhawalkar and Roughgarden considered a combinatorial auction with item bidding where all bidders' valuations are subadditive and showed that every pure Nash equilibrium has a welfare at least 1 2 of the social optimal welfare (thus, the price of anarchy is at most 2 if a pure Nash equilibrium exists) under the assumption of no "overbidding" [1] . Furthermore, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden suggested the following open problem: "Identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding and subadditive valuations."
In this paper, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding by two bidders when both valuations are subadditive and symmetric (i.e., f i (S ) = f i (T ) for all subsets S , T ⊆ M with |S | = |T |) under the assumption of no "overbidding." Symmetric valuations were considered in Refs. [12] , [13] . An auction with symmetric valuations is called a multi-unit auction and several results have been proposed in multi-unit auctions [2] , [9] , [11] . The auction for the super-long-term Japanese Goverment Bonds is an example of multi-unit auctions [7] .
Combinatorial Auctions and Item Bidding
As mentioned before, in a combinatorial auction, we are given a set of n bidders N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a set of m items M = {1, 2, . . . , m}. In this paper, we only consider the case of n = 2. Thus, N = {1, 2}. Each bidder i ∈ N has a valuation f i which assigns, for each subset S ⊆ M, a nonnegative number f i (S ). We denote a valuation profile of two bidders by f = ( f 1 , f 2 ). In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, each bidder i ∈ N has a nonnegative bid b i ( j) for each item j ∈ M and i's bid is denoted by
We denote a bid profile of two bidders by b = (b 1 , b 2 ). We also write b −i for each i ∈ N which is the bid of the bidder different
Feasibility of b = (b 1 , b 2 ) (i.e., "no overbidding") is defined as follows.
be a valuation profile and a bid profile of two bidders, respectively. For each
In a combinatorial auction with item bidding (by two or more bidders) [1] , [3] , the second price auction is used. Thus, items are allocated as follows. In a bid profile b = (b 1 , b 2 ), if bidder i ∈ N has bid b i ( j) for j ∈ M which is higher than the other bidder's bid
then bidder i will win and obtain j ∈ M. In this case, the price of item j ∈ M, denoted by price( j), is defined by the second highest bid among the bids of all bidders (i.e., the lower bid of two bidders).
For item j ∈ M, if both bids for j are the same, then exactly one bidder will win and obtain j. In this case, if i wins, then the price of j will be price( j) = b −i ( j) = b i ( j). In this paper, we assume that, for each item j ∈ M, at least one bidder's bid is positive. (We can generalize the arguments in this paper for the case where there can be some items j with b i ( j) = 0 for both bidders i ∈ N.) For a bid profile b = (b 1 , b 2 ) and for each bidder i ∈ N, let X i (b) be the set of items (i wins and) allocated to i. Then
Nash equilibrium is defined as follows. 
for both bidders i ∈ N and for all feasible bid profiles
is called a pure Nash equilibrium (Nash equilibrium in short).
In this paper, we make the following assumptions on each val-
Then v i is well defined by symmetry of f i in the assumption above. Using this symmetric valuation v i , we can write (i), (ii) and (iii) in the assumption above and the payoff as follows.
be a valuation profile and a bid profile of two bidders, respectively. The payoff
Since we will give a characterization of the existence of Nash equilibria under the assumption of no "overbidding", we first consider the feasibility of a bid profile.
Definition 3 For each bidder
be a valuation satisfying Assumption 1 and let w i be a function with w i (0) = 0 and, for each k i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m},
Then each w i (i ∈ N) has the following properties. First we have
since w i (0) = v i (0) = 0 and, for all k i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m},
by the definition of w i (k i ). Similarly, we have
and
Eq. (4), we have
Finally, we have
. . , m}, and
by the monotonicity of v i and
Throughout this paper, we use the following assumption. Assumption 2 For each i ∈ N, v i in u = (v 1 , v 2 ) satisfies Assumption 1 and w i in w = (w 1 , w 2 ) is the function defined in Definition 3.
Then we have the following theorem, which will play a central role in the proof of the main result in this paper.
Theorem 1 For any bid profile b = (b 1 , b 2 ) and for each bidder i ∈ N, let the elements of each
be ordered in nondecreasing order by using a permutation π i on M = {1, 2, . . . , m} as follows:
that is, the sum of largest k i bids in
Thus, the bid profile b = (b 1 , b 2 ) is feasible if and only if Eq. (9) holds for every i ∈ N and every k i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. Proof: (Sufficiency) Suppose Eq. (9) holds for i ∈ N and every
, the sum of the k i bids of items in S i is at most the sum of the largest k i bids, i.e., (3) 
for all k i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} and
Furthermore, since, in
. . , k i }, the average of the largest k i bids is at most the average of the largest k i − 1 bids, we have
by Eq. (8) . Thus, we have
By combining this with Eq. (11), we have
for any k i = 1, 2, . . . , k i . Thus, by combining this with the definition of w i in Eq. (2), we have
and Eq. (9) for every k i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. By Theorem 1, we have the following corollary. 
Existence of Nash Equilibria
In this section, we first give some technical terms and lemmas for explaining the main result in this paper, and then give its proof.
Definition 4 Let
Then we have the following lemma and the main result. M 2 ) is the partition of M into two subsets and d −i ( j) = 0 for each j ∈ M i by Eq. (13).
Lemma 1 The bid profile
We will prove that d = (d 1 , d 2 ) is feasible. To clarify the argument, we will give a proof for i = 1. By symmetry, a proof for i = 2 is also obtained.
Let k 1 = |M 1 | and let the elements of bid vector d 1 be ordered by using some permutation σ 1 on M as follows:
Then,
and, for every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ k 1 , we have
The feasibility of d 1 can be obtained as follows. Since
On the other hand, if
where the last inequality is obtained from Eq. Before giving a proof of Theorem 2, we give simple examples. Example 1. Let N = {1, 2}, M = {1, 2, 3} and let
Then each v i (i ∈ N) satisfies Assumption 1, and
In this case, by Theorem 2, there is no Nash equilibrium which can be shown as follows.
By symmetry, we can assume there are only four distinct partitions
2 ) defined by Eq. (13) are
2 = (0, 0, 0).
It can then be easily seen that bidder 1 can improve his payoff in the feasible bid profile
and the payoff u 1 (X 1 (d (k) )) for k = 0, 1, 2 become as follows.
and, for k = 1, 2,
Similarly, for k = 3, if bidder 2 changes bid d
= (0, 0, 2) then bidder 2 can improve her payoff in the feasible bid profile d
2 ) from 0 to 0.5. Actually,
By Theorem 2, the valuation profile u = (v 1 , v 2 ) in Eq. (17) has no Nash equilibrium. Example 2. Let N = {1, 2}, M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and
for each i ∈ N. Then each v i (i ∈ N) satisfies Assumption 1 and 
2 ) defined by Eq. (13) is
2 = (0, 0, 0, 1.5, 1.5).
The feasible bid profile
2 ) with X
= {4, 5} is not a Nash equilibrium: if bidder 2 changes bid d
and she can improve her payoff in the feasible bid profile d
2 ) from 3 to 4. However, d
(
2 ) with
2 ) = 6) and
2 ) = 3) are both Nash equilibria. We give an outline of the proof of Theorem 2 using the following notation. (1), c i (2) , . . . , c i (m)) be defined by 
Basic Properties of a Feasible Bid Profile b
To prove Lemma 2, we need the concept of prestability and stability. 
Based on these observations, from now on, we will consider only a prestable bid profile b = (b 1 , b 2 ), and assume that, for each i ∈ N, the set of items Y i = X i (b) allocated to bidder i and a permutation π −i satisfy Eqs. 
for all k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m − y i and From this theorem, we can also obtain the proof of Lemma 2 without much difficulty.
Proof of Lemma 2
Finally, we study properties of c = (c 1 , c 2 ) defined by Eq. (18) and complete the proof of Lemma 2. Note that, for each i ∈ N, Y i = X i (b) and y i = |Y i |. For each i ∈ N, let X i (c) be the set of items allocated to bidder i in c = (c 1 , c 2 ) . Thus, we have
by the definition of c = (c 1 , c 2 ) in Eq. (18). We order the items not contained in X i (c) in nondecreasing order in b −i . Thus, we can assume that the items in
m−yi } are ordered as follows:
Similarly, we consider c −i and order the items in
m−yi } in nondecreasing order in c −i by using a permutation σ −i as follows:
Then the following lemma holds (see Appendix for its proof).
Lemma 4 Let i ∈ N and k i ≤ m − y i be a nonnegative integer. Then
i.e., the sum of the k i smallest bids for the items in
is at most the sum of the k i smallest bids for the items in Y −i in c −i .
By using this lemma and Theorem 3, we can obtain the proof of Lemma 2. Proof of Lemma 2 : Suppose to the contrary that, c = (c 1 , c 2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium even though b = (b 1 , b 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium. Then there would be a bidder i ∈ N such that if bidder i changes the bid then in the resulting bid profile bidder i will obtain a greater payoff. Thus, by symmetry, we can assume i = 1 and bidder 1 changes c 1 to c 1 so that his payoff u 1 (X 1 (c )) of X 1 (c ) of items allocated to him in the bid profile c = (c 1 , c 2 ) is greater than his payoff u 1 (X 1 (c 1 )) in the bid profile c = (c 1 , c 2 ) . Thus, we have
We will show below that this leads to a contradiction. We can assume X 1 (c ) ⊇ X 1 (c). Actually, for every j ∈ X 1 (c), we have c 2 ( j) = 0 by the definition of c, and, by the monotonicity of v 1 , we can modify c 1 ( j) so that X 1 (c ) may include j without decreasing the value of u 1 (X 1 (c )) (by decreasing a bid for some item in X 1 (c ) − X 1 (c) if necessary). Now let
Since
by applying Lemma 4, we have 
by Definition 7 and Theorem 3. By combining these, we have u 1 (X 1 (c )) ≤ v 1 (y 1 ). However, this contradicts
in Eq. (28). Thus, c = (c 1 , c 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have given a necessary and sufficient condition for a valuation profile u = (v 1 , v 2 ) satisfying Assumption 1 to have a Nash equilibrium in Theorem 2. We give some remarks below.
Note that, if all valuations v i are submodular and symmetric then it is easily shown that we can obtain a Nash equilibrium which also maximizes the social welfare (thus, it is optimal) in polynomial time in n and m, however, the price of anarchy remains 2 [14] . This implies that the price of anarchy cannot be improved even if we restrict valuations to be symmetric.
The results in this paper can be generalized to the case of n ≥ 3. That is, if n is fixed, we can decide in polynomial time whether a combinatorial auction has a Nash equilibrium or not if all valuations v i are subadditive and symmetric [14] . However, if n is not fixed, our algorithm becomes exponential in n. Thus, we pose the following questions: is there a polynomial time algorithm to decide whether the model of the combinatorial auction in this paper with general n ≥ 3 has a Nash equilibrium or not? Is it possible to relax the constraint of symmetry in a valuation and to obtain a similar result which might lead to an answer to the open question posed by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden in Ref. [1] .
A recent paper by Dobzinski, Fu, and Kleinberg [4] revealed that exponential communication is required in order to find a pure no-overbidding Nash equilibrium in combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders, even if such an equilibrium is known to exist. However, this does not settle the open question posed by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden. Note also that, this does not imply that any algorithm for deciding whether there is a pure nooverbidding equilibrium in combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders requires exponential time.
However, this is a contradiction, because b i is prestable. Thus,
Now let i = 1, and let π 2 be an identical permutation (i.e., π 2 ( j) = j for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m) by changing labels of items if necessary. Then by Eqs. (19) and (20) by choosing π 1 appropriately. Such a permutation π 1 is obtained by the same argument above.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
To clarify the argument, we will give a proof for i = 1. Thus,
and σ −i = σ 2 . By symmetry, a proof for i = 2 is also obtained and we will omit it.
Let Y 2 be the set of k 1 items of Y 2 = X 2 (c) = M − X 1 (c) corresponding to k 1 smallest bids in c 2 , i.e., Thus, we have the sum of the smallest k 1 bids of Y 2 in b 2 is at most
and Eq. (27) for i = 1.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We assume Eq. (19), i.e.,
To prove Theorem 3, we need some notation. 
Let g i be the smallest such integer h i . Then
and (A.7)
(A.8)
Proof:
To clarify the argument, we will give a proof for i = 1.
By symmetry, a proof for i = 2 is also obtained. Furthermore, we can assume that π 2 is an identical permutation and π 2 ( j) = j for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m by changing labels of items if necessary. Thus, Eq. (19) can be written as follows:
Suppose that there were no such h 1 with 1
for each h 1 = 1, 2, . . . , g 1 (b 2 ) + 1. Let b 1 and π 1 be defined by
Then we have
for all h 1 with 1 ≤ h 1 ≤ g 1 (b 2 ) + 1 (and Thus, we have w 1 (g 1 ) = v 1 (g 1 ). Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3
Since we have already shown the sufficiency of Theorem 3, we have only to show the necessity: If b = (b 1 , b 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium then it is stable.
Suppose to the contrary that b = (b 1 , b 2 ) is not stable even if it is Nash equilibrium (and thus, prestable). Then, for some i ∈ N and some k, k (1 ≤ k ≤ m − y i , 1 ≤ k ≤ y i ) with y 1 + y 2 = m, Eqs. (21) or (22) would not hold.
To clarify the argument, we will give a proof for i = 1. Thus, b i = b 1 , π i = π 1 , b −i = b 2 and π −i = π 2 . By symmetry, a proof for i = 2 is also obtained and we will omit it. Furthermore, we can assume that π 2 is an identical permutation (i.e., π 2 ( j) = j for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m) by changing labels of items if necessary. Thus, Eqs. for all 1 ≤ k ≤ y 1 . This is equivalent to
